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P arag Pathak was born in the Finger Lakes region of New York State to parents who had immigrated from Kathmandu,  Nepal.  Parag’s father obtained a medical degree in Nepal, did an ear-nose-and-throat residency at George-
town University, and practiced in New York. Parag’s mother went to university in 
India. She was born into a famous family of priests that dates back to the early nine-
teenth century. Her grandfather was a noted Sanskrit scholar with the title “Nayaab 
Bada Guruju,” which translates as “Great Teacher” or “Royal Preceptor.” Parag has 
two sisters. Rachana is an assistant attorney general in New York. While Parag was 
still at home, she taught at Elmira College and Parag was often a sounding board 
for her lectures. Parag credits her with developing his early interest in social science. 
Sapana is an emergency room physician in Charlotte, North Carolina. Parag’s youth 
was spent in a scholarly family environment.
Parag received his AB summa cum laude in Applied Mathematics from Harvard 
in 2002, and a SM in Applied Math the same year. He received his doctorate in 
economics from Harvard in 2007. Since then, Parag has been employed at MIT 
where he is presently the Jane Berkowitz Carlton and Dennis William Carlton 
Professor of Microeconomics. Parag is married to Dr. Rhuma Rjbhandati, and they 
have two children. The American Economic Association awarded the 2018 John 
Bates Clark Medal to Parag Pathak for his research on the impacts of educational 
policies. We will survey some highlights from this work, as listed in Table 1. 
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An Overview of the Economic Researcher
Parag is part theorist, part empiricist, and fully problem-motivated. His major 
work is grounded in the institutional details of the educational system. The theory 
identifies ways to improve that system, while the empirical work determines what 
aspects of the theory were most important to implement and evaluates the conse-
quences of policy changes. In addition, Parag actively communicates his and his 
coauthors’ findings to the policy community. As a result, those findings have had a 
major impact on school reforms in many cities both within the United States and 
abroad. This is a rare combination of qualities for any economist, but especially rare 
for an economist under the age of 40.
Parag’s most influential contributions are about market design and its applica-
tion to the problem of the allocation of students to schools. That literature dates to 
a paper by Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003) in the American Economic Review that 
motivated the head of the Boston Public School system to contact a group working 
on mechanism design. New York City, which was using an allocation system that was 
not functioning well, made a similar request.
Parag and collaborators analyzed the performance of the systems used in Boston 
and New York and proposed alternatives that were ultimately implemented. Parag’s 
subsequent research on school allocation used theory to deepen our understanding 
of the implications of both the mechanisms that had not yet been reformed and of 
the institutional constraints that had been incorporated into some of the reformed 
allocation mechanisms. These implications were communicated to administrators, 
Parag Pathak
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Table 1 
Selected Papers by Parag Pathak
1. “The New York City High School Match” (with Atila Abdulkadirog˘lu and Alvin Roth). 2005. 
American Economic Review 95(2): 364–367. 
2. “The Boston Public Schools Match” (with Atila Abdulkadirog˘lu, Alvin Roth, and Tayfun Sönmez). 
2005. American Economic Review 95(2): 368–371.
3. “Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism” (with 
Tayfun Sönmez). 2008. American Economic Review 98(4): 1636–52.
4. “Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High 
School Match” (with Atila Abdulkadirog˘lu and Alvin E. Roth). 2009. American Economic Review 
99(5): 1954–78.
5. “Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets” (with Fuhito Kojima). 2009. 
American Economic Review 99(3): 608–627. 
6. “Inputs and Impacts in Charter Schools: KIPP Lynn” (with Joshua D. Angrist, Susan M. Dynarski, 
Thomas J. Kane, and Christopher R. Walters). 2010. American Economic Review 100(2): 239–43.
7. “Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston’s Charters and Pilots” 
(with Atila Abdulkadirog˘lu, Joshua D. Angrist, Susan M. Dynarski, and Thomas J. Kane). 2011. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(2): 699–748. 
8. “Who Beneﬁts from KIPP?” (with Joshua D. Angrist, Susan M. Dynarksi, Thomas J. Kane, and 
Christopher R. Walters). 2012. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31(4): 837–60. 
9. “Explaining Charter School Effectiveness” (with Joshua D. Angrist and Christopher R. Walters). 
2013. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5(4): 1–27.
10. “School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their 
Vulnerability to Manipulation” (with Tayfun Sönmez). 2013. American Economic Review 103(1): 
80–106. 
11. “The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools” (with Atila 
Abdulkadirog˘lu and Joshua Angrist). 2014. Econometrica 82(1): 137–96. 
12. “The Distributional Consequences of Public School Choice” (with Christopher Avery). 2015. 
NBER Working Paper 21525.
13. “The Efficiency of Race-Neutral Alternatives to Race-Based Affirmative Action: Evidence from 
Chicago’s Exam Schools” (with Glenn Ellison). 2016. NBER Working Paper 22589. 
14. “Charters Without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston” (with Atila 
Abdulkadirog˘lu, Joshua D. Angrist, and Peter D. Hull). 2016. American Economic Review 106(7): 
1878–1920. 
15. “The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School 
Match” (with Atila Abdulkadirog˘lu and Nikhil Agarwal). 2017. American Economic Review 107(12): 
3635–89.
16. “Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans’ OneApp” (with Atila 
Abdulkadirog˘lu, Yeon-Koo Che, Alvin E. Roth, and Olivier Tercieux). 2017. NBER Working Paper 
23265. 
17. “Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism” (with 
Nikhil Agarwal and Paulo Somaini). 2018. Econometrica  86(2): 391–444. 
18. “Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones” (with Umut 
M. Dur, Scott Duke Kominers, and Tayfun Sönmez). 2018. Journal of Political Economy 126(6): 
2457–79. 
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generating both additional impetus for reforms in the older allocation mechanisms 
and further refinements in those mechanisms proposed by Pathak and his collabo-
rators. The depth of Parag’s knowledge of the institutions in Boston and his ability 
to communicate ways to improve the assignment mechanism to administrators led 
the late Mayor Thomas Menino to appoint Pathak as chief technical advisor for 
Boston’s student assignment plan in 2013. 
While focusing on school assignment, the knowledge of the institutional struc-
tures in the educational system that Parag developed led him and his coauthors to 
innovative empirical work on the impacts of different types of schools in different 
neighborhoods. This included empirical results on the impact of charters, pilots, 
and exam schools. 
The data generated by the new allocation mechanisms has enabled Parag and a 
somewhat different set of coauthors (though not totally different; Parag has collabo-
rated extensively with Atila Abdulkadirog˘lu on both theoretical and empirical work) 
to estimate detailed models of school choice that are capable of empirically analyzing 
a wide assortment of questions. The choice models, in conjunction with different 
assignment rules, allow for counterfactual analysis that enables a quantitative compar-
ison of different allocation systems. They can also be used to analyze the effect of the 
assignment mechanisms on students with different characteristics. These papers have 
proved particularly valuable to administrators, as they clarify just what aspects of the 
reforms are central to the gains that come from different assignment rules. 
The Underlying Issue: Allocation Mechanisms That Do Not Involve Price
Design of a school allocation system is part of a class of problems that arise when 
objects have to be allocated without the use of prices. In markets where prices are 
used, allocations are determined by a combination of factors: tastes, the prices of the 
goods marketed, and endowments. However, there are many circumstances in which 
society (or a relevant subset like a sports league) does not want to allow endowments 
to overly impact allocations (the National Basketball Association conducts a draft 
rather than letting wage offers clear the market for the entering cohort of players). 
One example is our society’s notion that students should have equal opportunity to 
their preferred schools (at least for the schools in the public school system).
Of course, there is a question of defining what equal opportunity means in 
this context, but conditional on our definition, we would like to allocate positions 
in schools in as efficient a way as possible. Families have heterogenous tastes; they 
differ in their preferences for school characteristics (importantly in the location 
of the school, but also in the importance of different educational resources). An 
allocation mechanism with desirable properties requires a procedure for eliciting 
those preferences. This is done through the requirement that families submit a 
preference list for the schools in the system. Consequently it would be useful if the 
allocation mechanism be “strategy proof ”;  that is, it should be in the interest of 
families to report their preferences honestly. 
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What other properties would we like? The most obvious other desirable property 
is Pareto efficiency; we should not be able to reallocate and improve one person’s 
welfare without reducing somebody else’s welfare. For school choice problems a 
stability property called “no justifiable envy” is also important. Assume that schools 
assign a priority to each student. An allocation has justifiable envy if a student would 
prefer another school to his assignment and a student of lower priority has a place 
at the preferred school.
The School Matching Problem: Some Background
The goal of the school choice problem is to assign each student to exactly one 
school. Students submit a ranking of schools to the school administration. Schools 
have capacities that limit the number of students that they can accept. They also 
have priorities, which are rankings over students. The priorities reflect institutional 
restrictions—for example, obligations to serve students who live nearby the school 
before admitting students who live further away, or to serve students who already 
have an older sibling in the school. A matching is an assignment of schools to 
students such that each student is assigned to one school and, for each school, the 
number of students assigned to the school does not exceed its capacity. 
When Pathak began working on this problem, the theoretical literature on 
matching mostly studied variations on the college assignment problem introduced 
by Gale and Shapley in a celebrated 1962 paper. Roth and Sotomayor had published 
a monograph surveying matching theory in 1990. The theory already had signifi-
cant impact on the design of markets, most prominently in the use of a matching 
algorithm to assign graduates of medical school to residency programs (Roth and 
Peranson 1999). The college assignment problem of Gale and Shapley is quite similar 
to the school choice problem. Students have rankings over colleges, and colleges have 
rankings over students. Colleges also have capacities that limit the number of students 
that they can accept. A matching is an assignment of schools to students such that 
each student is assigned to one college and, for each college, the number of students 
assigned to the college does not exceed its capacity. Gale and Shapley formulate the 
problem and then present the “deferred acceptance” algorithm, which is a procedure 
that generates a matching that has desirable properties. We describe the deferred 
acceptance algorithm in more detail later. 
Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez’s (2003) paper was the immediate precursor for 
Pathak’s work. Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez formulated the school choice problem 
and compared it to the college assignment problem. They identified the most 
important formal difference between the problems. In the college assignment 
problem, each side of the market has preferences defined over the other side (and 
staying unmatched). Efficient matches have the property that there is no other 
match that makes all agents and all colleges better off. In school matching, it makes 
sense to consider the welfare of students, but it is less meaningful to talk about the 
preferences of schools. A match in the school choice problem is efficient if it is not 
possible to find another match that makes all students better off. 
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The literature notes that schools may face constraints about the kind of students 
they would like. To take account of this, the school matching literature considers alloca-
tion mechanisms that are consistent with “priorities”—in particular, the “no justifiable 
envy” property is conditional on the priorities assigned to students. Priorities may be 
the same for all schools. For example, if there are district-wide tests, schools may assign 
higher priority to students with higher test scores. Priorities may be specific to each 
school. For example, schools may assign higher priority to students who live closer to 
the school or have an older sibling who attends the school. Priorities may be set by 
the central administration (as in New York’s system prior to reforms) or by individual 
schools (as in Boston’s system prior to reforms). Some aspects of priorities may be 
captured by student preferences, but others will not be. For example, if Student 1 lives 
close to School 1 and Student 2 lives close to School 2, but Student 1 prefers School 
2 to School 1 and Student 2 prefers School 1 to School 2, then the students would be 
happy with an assignment that places Student 1 in School 2 and Student 2 in School 
1. The district, however, might not like the transportation costs associated with this 
assignment. When students near to the school have higher priority, then the assign-
ment of Student 1 to School 1 and Student 2 to School 2 will not have justifiable envy. 
Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003) point out that satisfying all three of the 
desirable properties introduced above—1) strategy-proofness, 2) efficiency, and 
3) no justifiable envy—is generally not possible. (This observation is a consequence of 
a result of Balinski and Sönmez 1999.) Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez discuss how the 
Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm applies to the school choice problem. 
The field of market design was emerging from infancy and headed for practical 
applications. 
Parag’s first two papers [1 and 2, as listed in Table 1], published while still a grad-
uate student, appeared in the Paper and Proceedings issue of the AER in 2005. “The 
Boston Public School Match’’ (with Abdulkadirog˘lu, Roth, and Sönmez) details the 
old allocation mechanism in Boston, explains the impact of the absence of incen-
tives for students to report their preferences truthfully in that system, and outlines 
the way an incentive-compatible system would work in the schooling context. “The 
New York City High School Match’’ (with Abdulkadirog˘lu and Roth) describes the 
old New York City high school system and the problems that it created. These articles 
identified ways in which the existing systems failed to satisfy desirable properties. 
The authors point to evidence that parents and students were confused about how 
the mechanisms operated, essentially showing that the mechanism was not strategy-
proof and that outcomes were inefficient, leaving students with poorer matches than 
was possible. These observations explain why New York chose the student-proposing 
deferred acceptance allocation mechanism that we will describe below.
Subsequently, Parag’s research on school allocation focused on using theory 
to deepen our understanding of the consequences of different allocation mech-
anisms given the institutional constraints the schools systems faced. To discuss 
Parag’s contributions in these matters in more detail, it is useful to describe four 
mechanisms: serial dictatorship, first preferences first, the student-optimal deferred 
acceptance mechanism, and the top-trading-cycle mechanism. 
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In a “serial dictatorship” mechanism, students make choices in sequence. It 
requires a method, typically based on test scores, which orders students. The first 
student then picks a favorite school. Subsequent students pick their favorite school 
subject to availability of seats. Serial Dictatorships are efficient and strategy-proof, 
but they are guaranteed to lead to stable outcomes only when the priorities assigned 
to students by every school is equal to the ordering of students. This situation arises 
in the college matching mechanisms in some countries where students are ordered 
by outcomes on national entrance exams. Serial dictatorship is inherently unfair 
because the students who choose early in the sequence have more choices than 
those who move later.  This procedural unfairness influences the final match unless 
the order students make choices is equal to a common priority of the students.
Prior to Parag’s research, several locations assigned students to schools using 
some form of a “first preferences first’’ or the old Boston mechanism. In these mech-
anisms, students rank schools. Assignments begin by looking at first choices. At each 
school, students who ranked a particular school first are assigned one-by-one to that 
school according to the priority assigned by the school until either all the seats at 
the school are filled or all students who ranked the school first are assigned to the 
school. If unassigned students remain, the mechanism moves to the next step. The 
next step looks at the second choice of the students yet to be assigned and assigns 
these students one-by-one according to priority assigned by the school until no seats 
remain or all unassigned students who ranked the school are assigned. The kth 
step of the algorithm looks at the kth choice of all students yet to be assigned and 
proceeds in an analogous manner. This mechanism is not strategy proof. Students 
should not rank their first choice first if they perceive that there will not be suffi-
cient capacity for them at that school. The two papers published in the 2005 AER 
Papers and Proceedings discuss this weakness of the first-preference-first assignments 
and explore some of its ramifications.
In the student-optimal deferred acceptance mechanism, students first apply to 
their first-choice school. Each school rejects the lowest-ranking students in excess of 
its capacity, keeping the rest of students, but only temporarily. Students not rejected 
at this step may be rejected later. In the second round, students rejected in the 
first round apply to the school next in their ranking. Each school considers these 
students and students who are temporarily held from the previous step together, 
and rejects the lowest-ranking students in excess of its capacity, keeping the rest of 
students temporarily. The kth step of the algorithm looks at the students not yet 
placed, and proceeds analogously. The deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy 
proof, and guarantees stability (that is, no justified envy), but not efficiency.
The top-trading-cycle mechanism is a modification of Gale’s top-trading-cycle 
mechanism introduced in a 1974 paper by Shapley and Scarf. The top-trading-cycle 
algorithm asks each student to designate their favorite school and each school to 
designate its highest priority student. Starting with any student, these designations 
create a chain. The odd elements of the chain are students. The even elements are 
schools. Following any student is the student’s favorite school; following any school is 
the school’s highest priority student. Because there are a finite number of students, 
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any such chain must contain a cycle: a series of designations that begins and ends 
with the same student. The algorithm assigns students in a cycle to the schools that 
they prefer most. In the next step of the algorithm, students with assignments are 
removed; the capacities of schools that received a student are reduced; and once 
again a cycle is found. This process repeats with the remaining students indicating 
their favorite school (among those with unused capacity) and schools now pointing 
to the highest priority unassigned student. The top-trading-cycle mechanism is 
strategy proof and guarantees efficiency but does not rule out justified envy.
Parag and School Assignment
As noted, prior to Pathak’s work, Boston and many other cities used first- 
preference-first procedures. The fact that these mechanisms were not strategy proof 
was a primary reason for the reforms. There are a number of arguments that lead to 
prioritizing strategy-proofness. Students could “game” the Boston mechanism, and, 
as a result, students who had more information could do better than others; a fact 
that Parag explores in joint work with Sönmez [3], work we discuss in more detail 
later. The strategy-proof mechanism eliminates the incentive to game and with it 
the potential for confusion when submitting preferences. For the same reason, 
it enables school districts to advise students sincerely that it is in their interest to 
report preferences honestly. 
Also, it is much easier to estimate the distribution of utility functions from 
submitted preferences that are truthful than from those that are not. It is the distri-
bution of utilities that is required for the analysis of the welfare implications of 
different assignment mechanisms (or, for that matter, any other rule change). As 
is illustrated in Parag’s empirical work with Abdulkadirog˘lu and Agarwal [15], in 
order to predict the outcome of the Boston mechanism, one needs a model for 
how students form their rank-order list when preference orderings can be strategic, 
and that model should take into account the student’s perceptions of what other 
students are likely to do. 
However, the argument that the deferred acceptance algorithm is strategy 
proof depends on the assumption that students can submit preferences of arbi-
trary length. For practical reasons, school districts impose limits on the number of 
schools that students may rank (and students may not take the trouble to submit 
a complete ranking). If students can rank only a small number of schools, even 
the deferred acceptance algorithm is not strategy proof. Students may wish to 
exaggerate their preference for a school, fearing that they will not have a high 
enough priority to be assigned to one of their top choices. It was already known 
that it is impossible to find a mechanism that is strategy proof, stable, and effi-
cient, but even strategy-proofness alone may also be hard to guarantee in practice. 
Motivated by these constraints and a need to advise administrators, Parag has 
shown that deferred acceptance is still less subject to manipulation than other 
mechanisms. 
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“School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms 
by their Vulnerability to Manipulation” (with Sönmez) [10], proposes a way to 
rank mechanisms that are not strategy proof. This article connects the theoretical 
results to events related to school choice mechanisms that occurred in Chicago and 
England around the time they were writing the paper. The Chicago school district 
changed their assignment system in 2009, asking 14,000 participants to submit 
preferences under two different mechanisms. The rationale for the change was a 
concern that the matches were sensitive to unimportant details (“high-scoring kids 
were being rejected simply because of the order in which they listed their college 
prep preferences”). However, the change involved moving from a first-preferences-
first mechanism that was vulnerable to manipulation to a deferred acceptance 
mechanism with finite lists that was also vulnerable to manipulation. Pathak and 
Sönmez [10] provide a framework that can compare two manipulable mechanisms 
to identify if one is less manipulable than the other. They show that the old Boston 
mechanism was the most manipulable mechanism, providing an argument in favor 
of the change. In England, by a 2007 Act of Parliament, the “first-preferences-first” 
mechanisms were ruled illegal. Just as in Chicago, new manipulable mechanisms 
were adopted, but Pathak and Sönmez [10] show again that these mechanisms were 
less manipulable than their predecessor. 
One way to see why the deferred acceptance algorithm is harder to manipulate 
than other procedures is to note that the others are particularly easy to manipulate. 
Take the Chicago first-preferences-first mechanism in which students submit lists of 
finite length greater than one. Assume that there are more students than openings 
at schools so that at least one student is unassigned. Consider a preference profile 
in which no student can manipulate the Chicago mechanism. It must be the case 
that students are assigned to their first choice. To see this, note that otherwise one 
student must be assigned to a school that is not her first choice. But then some 
school does not fill all of its openings in the first round of the algorithm. An unas-
signed student could receive a place at that school by ranking it first. This argument 
suggests that the only preference profiles that are not subject to manipulation in the 
Chicago mechanism are quite special. The deferred acceptance algorithm will work 
well with these profiles too.
The deferred acceptance algorithm with finite lists may not be strategy proof, 
but it is less subject to manipulation than alternatives. There is another reason why 
the possibility of manipulation may be limited. Pathak (with Kojima) has written 
about the performance of matching markets with a large number of participants in 
the paper “Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets” [5]. Real 
school choice problems have a lot of participants, and there is a general intuition 
that incentives to manipulate may decrease in large markets. These results are rele-
vant for the school choice literature reviewed above, but are more broadly significant 
for applications of market design to other situations. Kojima and Pathak’s paper [5] 
also studies what happens when mechanisms permit schools and students to submit 
truncated lists of preferences. The paper shows that the fraction of participants with 
incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches 
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zero as the market becomes large. Hence, it provides another reason to be reassured 
that deferred acceptance works well, even when students submit truncated preference 
lists. The observation that the Chicago mechanism is subject to manipulation unless 
all students assigned to schools are assigned to their first choice suggests that large 
numbers alone will not make other mechanisms less subject to manipulation. 
The complexity of certain school choice mechanisms leads to distributional 
concerns that Parag captures in another paper with Sönmez: “Leveling the Playing 
Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism” [3]. The deferred 
acceptance algorithm identifies a matching that Pareto dominates any equilibrium 
outcome of the Boston mechanism provided everyone is submitting their true pref-
erence ordering. The puzzle is that some parent groups resisted the change from 
the Boston mechanism to the deferred acceptance mechanism. The paper provides 
a compelling solution to the puzzle. Pathak and Sönmez look at outcomes of the 
Boston mechanism when a subset of the population is naïve (and reports prefer-
ences honestly) while the rest of the population is strategic. The equilibrium with 
mixed levels of sophistication may have justifiable envy and, importantly, may lead 
to an assignment in which the sophisticated agents are better off than they are from 
the deferred acceptance match. The analysis provides a fairness justification for the 
deferred acceptance mechanism and explains why changes to school assignment 
mechanisms—even ones that provide Pareto improvements when all players are 
sophisticated—need not receive unanimous approval. Hence, the deferred accep-
tance algorithm “levels the playing field” by eliminating an advantage for strategic 
sophistication built into the Boston mechanism. As noted above, this was one of the 
goals of the assignment reforms. 
Deferred acceptance algorithms are the most common allocation system 
recommended by market designers. These mechanisms are attractive because they 
generate stable outcomes (eliminating justified envy) while maintaining incentives 
for truthful revelation. They have the theoretical weakness in that they do not provide 
Pareto-efficient matches. No incentive-compatible mechanism can both eliminate 
justified envy and guarantee efficiency, but the deferred acceptance mechanism 
comes close in the sense that it weakly dominates all other incentive-compatible mech-
anisms that eliminate justified envy. “Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The 
Design of New Orleans’ OneApp” (with Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che, Roth, and Tercieux) 
[16], establishes a dual result for the top-trading-cycle mechanism. It shows that 
no incentive-compatible Pareto-efficient mechanism has less justified envy (fewer 
blocking pairs) than the top-trading-cycle mechanism. Using data from New Orleans 
(which at the time used a top-trading-cycle mechanism), the paper demonstrates 
(in a setting not covered by the paper’s theorem) the ability of top-trading-cycle 
mechanisms to perform better than other procedures that are Pareto-efficient and 
incentive compatible. The practical message of the paper is a new argument for 
using top-trading-cycle mechanisms when efficiency is the primary goal.
Pathak has moved from making persuasive arguments that led to changes in allo-
cation systems, to studying details of actual markets to better align theory to practice, 
to conducting detailed analysis of the performance of school allocation methods. 
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After schools gained experience with new allocation procedures, there were 
opportunities to evaluate how the reforms were working. The research brought 
some new conceptual challenges. Theoretical studies of the college assignment 
problem recognized that important results required the assumption of strict prefer-
ences. For the most part, the literature ignored the problem of a possible tie in the 
ranking of different preferences. It viewed such ties as unlikely to arise in practice. 
However, ties are a practical concern in the school assignment problem. For the 
schools, priorities play the role of preferences. Priorities frequently do not distin-
guish between pairs of students (two students who both live outside of the school 
district and have no siblings in the school may have the same priority). One can 
implement the algorithm by breaking these ties arbitrarily, but tiebreaking rules 
have consequences. The deferred acceptance algorithm still generates stable and 
strategy-proof outcomes, but some stability constraints are artificial consequences 
of tiebreaking rules and may have negative impact on efficiency.
“Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Rede-
signing the NYC High School Match” (with Abdulkadirog˘lu and Roth) [4] is an 
example of a study that assesses the consequences of reforms in the matching proce-
dures. Because tiebreaking rules have consequences, it is important to study the 
implication of different kinds of rules. It is useful to distinguish single-tiebreaking 
(assigning an order to students that breaks ties the same way for all schools) and 
multiple-tiebreaking (using different tiebreaking rules at different schools). Moti-
vated by simulation results that showed advantages of single tiebreaking rules, 
the paper demonstrates that although there are outcomes that can be produced 
using the deferred acceptance algorithm with multiple tiebreaking that cannot 
be produced using single tiebreaking, these outcomes will not be student-optimal 
stable matchings. They also show that there is no tiebreaking rule that is strategy 
proof and dominates deferred acceptance with single tiebreaking. These results 
acknowledge that ties may cause problems (single tiebreaking is not guaranteed 
to lead to a student-optimal stable match), but describe a sense in which single 
tiebreaking provides as good an allocation as alternatives.
Another way in which the practical implementation of matches differs from 
the theory is the possibility that priorities differ for different subsets of the schools’ 
seats. In “Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s 
Walk Zones,” Pathak and coauthors Dur, Kominers, and Sönmez [18] identify 
unusual properties of matching mechanisms when priorities for school seats have 
a slot-specific nature. For example, in Boston, initially walk-zone priority applied 
at half of a school’s seats, while it did not at the other half. Students were allowed 
to apply to both halves, but the order of their application in both had an impor-
tant effect on the overall assignment. Surprisingly, the fact that the slots were 
processed sequentially resulted in an assignment nearly identical to that without 
any walk-zone priority, despite the perception that walk-zone applicants gain an 
edge. The paper establishes formal results on priorities and precedence, and 
describes how transparency on these results contributed to the end of Boston’s 
walk-zone priority. 
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Parag and Educational Policy
As Parag got to know the administrative structure of different school systems, 
he became aware of opportunities to use that structure to unravel policy-relevant 
facts on the impacts of other aspects of educational policy. We focus on his contri-
butions to the understanding of the impacts of charter schools and then note how 
Parag and his coauthors’ research have interfaced with broader aspects of educa-
tional policy. 
In “Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston’s 
Charters and Pilots,” Parag and coauthors (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Angrist, Dynarski, 
and Kane) [7] examine the impact of two competing models of school autonomy 
in Boston on student achievement. Charter schools are treated as their own inde-
pendent school districts and are not subject to the teachers’ union contract. Pilot 
schools have most of the flexibility of charter schools but continue to be covered by 
the union contract provisions for the teachers. The authors use the random assign-
ment nature of lotteries for entry into oversubscribed charter and pilot schools in 
Boston as a plausible identification strategy. They compare test scores of students 
with similar backgrounds who applied and were not accepted to an oversubscribed 
school to an accepted student, three years after the lottery decision was made. The 
results are striking. On one hand, among the students who subscribe to an over-
subscribed charter school, winning the lottery is consistently associated with large 
increases in test scores. On the other hand, among students who subscribe to an 
oversubscribed pilot school that use lotteries to determine acceptance, winning the 
lottery is not associated with increased performance. 
These results left open two questions. First, what were the characteristics of the 
oversubscribed charters that led to their effectiveness in serving the population that 
applied to them? Second, what were the characteristics of the students who applied 
and benefitted from them? A series of papers pursued these issues. In joint research 
with Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, and Walters [8], Pathak conducted the first evaluation 
of a Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) charter school using assignment lotteries. 
The KIPP schools are the so-called “No Excuses” schools and feature a long school 
day and year, selective teacher hiring, strict behavior norms, and encourage a strong 
student work ethic. They are the largest charter school system in the United States.
The KIPP schools in Lynn, Massachusetts, were initially undersubscribed 
and then oversubscribed. Using the lottery system in the oversubscribed years to 
construct a quasi-experimental evaluation, “Who Benefits from KIPP?” [8] and 
“Inputs and Impacts of Charter Schools: KIPP Lynn” [6] (both with coauthors 
Angrist, Dynarksi, Kane, and Walters) provide evidence that KIPP Lynn generated 
substantial score gains for lottery winners, with the estimates being remarkably 
similar to those reported for Boston charters. The gains seemed a bit larger for 
those who entered with lower achievement levels.
These results added to a growing body of evidence suggesting that urban 
charter schools have the potential to generate impressive achievement gains, espe-
cially for minority students living in high-poverty areas. A puzzling fact is that there 
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is little evidence of achievement gains at charter schools outside of high-poverty 
urban areas. In “Explaining Charter School Effectiveness” [9], Pathak and coauthors 
Angrist and Walters examine a large sample of charter schools throughout Massa-
chusetts using the lottery research design. The paper indicates that the relatively 
higher effectiveness of urban charter schools might be explained by adherence to 
the “No Excuses” approach to urban education discussed above.
One problematic feature of the lottery studies is that they rely on select samples of 
students: specifically, those who apply to a subset of schools and were lottery assigned. 
Were a more inclusive segment of the population to attend charters, the average effect 
of charters might be different. In the paper “Charters Without Lotteries: Testing Take-
overs in New Orleans and Boston,” Parag and his coauthors Abdulkadirog˘lu, Angrist, 
and Hull [14] look at schools that were taken over by charters, focusing on students 
who were grandfathered into the charter system. Following Hurricane Katrina, 
state legislation allowed the Louisiana Department of Education to take control 
of and delegate the operation of low-performing schools to outside operators. By 
2015, the Recovery School District became the first all-charter school district in the 
United States. Takeovers of underperforming schools have also occurred in Boston 
and are increasingly being used in other states and countries. Though there is still 
some selection involved in the takeover experiments (some students may switch out 
of the district to which the school is assigned) the selection problem in takeover 
studies is likely to be much less serious than in situations where student apply to 
charters. Their results from the takeover studies in low-performing urban environ-
ments suggest that charters boost achievement by as much or more than the gains 
estimated from lottery studies in low-performing urban environments. 
There are a number of other educational policy areas where Parag and his coau-
thors have been influential contributors. In “The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects 
at Boston and New York Exam Schools” [11], Parag together with Abdulkadirog˘lu 
and Angrist use a regression discontinuity design to examine whether students who 
scored close to the acceptance line and were accepted to an exam school in New York 
and Boston did better than those who were close to the acceptance line but rejected. 
Marginally accepted students show only scattered gains from attending the exam 
school. This result depends on the characteristics of the marginally accepted appli-
cants, but it does raise two questions. First, do exam schools help, and if so, whom do 
they help? Second, overall performance at exam schools is much higher than at alter-
native schools, so the paper also raises questions on the validity of prior findings of 
peer effects on school achievement. Prior findings were mixed, leaving the possibility 
that peer effects matter while Parag’s results suggest instead that students perform 
better because they are more qualified, since the impact of school assignment (and 
hence of peer achievement) has a small impact on the marginally accepted students. 
Parag’s recent work, as yet unpublished, follows up on themes that were related 
though not central to his prior work but very much in the public policy debate. “The 
Efficiency of Race-Neutral Alternatives for Race-Based Affirmative Action: Evidence 
from Chicago’s Exam Schools” (NBER Working Paper 22589) [13] with Glenn 
Ellison measures the welfare costs of affirmative-action programs. School districts 
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wish to balance diversity goals with matching high-quality students to high-quality 
schools. Ellison and Pathak examine admission procedures at elite public schools 
in Chicago. These schools have shifted from a system that used explicit race-based 
quotas to one in which schools admit a fraction of their classes on the basis of perfor-
mance measures only, while allocating the remaining fraction to districts using (not 
directly race-based) proxies of neighborhood socioeconomic status. The paper 
makes the straightforward theoretical observation that when racial diversity is valu-
able, limiting attention to race-neutral schemes is inefficient. It elaborates upon this 
observation with an analysis of data from the Chicago school district that provides 
a quantitative measure of the efficiency costs. Diversity goals lead to a reduction in 
test scores of elite schools, but in the two schools that are the focus of this study, a 
race-based system would eliminate more than three-quarters of the reduction that 
seem to be caused by the school district’s race-neutral procedure. The paper points 
out that Chicago’s current system also fails to achieve the socioeconomic diversity 
achieved by a system that takes race into account. Loosely, the efficiency losses arise 
because a race-neutral system may give priority to low scorers in one district over 
higher scorers from demographically similar districts. 
Chris Avery and Parag present a model in “The Distributional Consequences 
of Public School Choice” (NBER Working Paper, 21525) [12] to compare school 
choice to residential-based assignment when housing markets are modeled 
explicitly. These papers make it clear that Parag has a lot left to contribute to our 
understanding of the impacts of different education policies, a fact that is likely to 
maintain interest in Parag’s work for some time to come.
Evaluating School Assignment Mechanisms
With more than ten years of experience, it is now possible to evaluate the 
impact of reforms to school choice mechanisms. In “The Welfare Effects of Coor-
dinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match” [15], 
Parag and coauthors Abdulkadirog˘lu and Agarwal return to the original problem of 
examining school assignment mechanisms, but now with the data and econometric 
tools that enable them to assess the impact of the reforms. The empirical assessment 
allows for the impacts of both administrative constraints and possible behavioral 
differences from what is assumed in the theoretical results. This is a powerful way to 
assess the impact of the reforms. 
This paper and a related paper with Agarwal and Somaini [17] also break new 
ground methodologically. To evaluate welfare, one must employ a utility function. 
The fact that applicants provide an ordered ranking of multiple schools enables the 
authors to use methodology that allows them to estimate an extremely rich set of 
utility functions quite precisely. Crucial here is the fact that the submitted ranking 
order across multiple schools generates an ability to let important characteristics, 
like school and home location, have coefficients that differ across applicants due to 
unmeasured factors (for example, a parent whose working day is longer than the 
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school day may submit a ranking with preferred schools all near a relative’s home). 
The second methodologically innovative aspect of these papers is the development 
of a framework that can evaluate allocations when the submitted preference lists can 
be strategic—that is, when truth-telling is not a dominant strategy (as in the Boston 
mechanism). They also show that under certain cognitive assumptions, there is a 
sense that truth-telling, on the one hand, and the assumption that each agent best 
responds to the actual distributions of others’ play, on the other, bound the results 
from different allocation mechanisms. 
Prior to the reform, New York high school students applied to 5 out of 600 
school programs; they could receive multiple offers and be placed on a wait list. The 
students were allowed to accept only one offer and one wait list, and the process 
went on for two more rounds. This is labeled the uncoordinated system. After the 
reform, all schools were integrated into one match, students could rank up to 12 
programs, and the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm determined 
the allocation. In both cases, unmatched students were administratively assigned.
The empirical results show a marked improvement in the distribution of 
welfare as a result of the reform. There were welfare gains for all groups, but they 
were largest for the disadvantaged. This was mostly because in the new allocation 
mechanism, fewer students got none of their listed choices. (These students were 
allocated in the administrative placement round, leading to assignments less desir-
able than any of the listed choices.) So the main qualitative finding is that the new 
system matches more than 80 percent of the students in the main round of the algo-
rithm, while prior to reforms this figure was about 50 percent. The students who are 
assigned administratively do not have a say in their school assignment.
Parag’s paper with Abdulkadirog˘lu and Agarwal [15] provides comparative 
results on the following mechanisms: neighborhood assignment, the uncoordi-
nated system, the reformed system, a student-optimal stable match, Pareto-efficient 
matching, and a utilitarian optimal matching with equal weight to all individuals 
(this last requires knowledge of the distribution of utility functions, and hence was 
not administratively feasible). Big increases in welfare were found when going from 
the neighborhood assignment to the uncoordinated system, and then again from 
the uncoordinated system to the reformed system that used a deferred acceptance 
system with an incomplete ranking of schools. However, further increases in going 
to Pareto efficiency or to a full deferred acceptance algorithm were very small.
These results are extremely useful to administrators as they provide guidance 
on where to assign priorities when institutional and perhaps cognitive constraints 
limit their ability to fully implement one of the theoretically preferred mechanisms.
Summary
Parag’s work has both improved our understanding of important aspects of 
the education system and improved the system itself. He combines knowledge 
of how institutions work with a theorist’s ability to formulate models, an applied 
246     Journal of Economic Perspectives
economist’s ability to develop and use tools for program analysis, and a policy advis-
er’s ability to communicate findings and recommend changes to decisionmakers. 
He formed working relationships with a wide range of colleagues, each of whom 
could help him unravel different aspects of the problems that he faced. He created 
relationships with and acquired detailed knowledge of the workings of many school 
districts, and the problems they face. This allowed him to do innovative empirical 
work. From the very start of his career, he has been able to use what he learned on 
the school districts’ problems to motivate new conceptual developments and then 
to use the theory to solve the motivating problem. 
He and his coauthors’ work on school admission mechanisms, much of it 
on the impact of different allocation rules, led to improvements being made to 
those mechanisms over the last decade and a half. When data became available 
to empirically analyze the impact of the changes, he developed and applied tech-
niques needed to quantify the impacts. This led to further improvements of the 
institutions. During the interim, he used the institutional knowledge he had gained 
from studying admission rules to do innovative studies of other central features of 
education policy, most notably the impact of charters and other semi-autonomous 
school systems. 
Through all of this Parag has paid great attention to detail, both in the institu-
tions being analyzed and in the analysis per se. This is a major reason that his work 
has been so influential and is a lesson to economists everywhere. The economics 
profession has a lot of tools. Parag has mastered many and used them—always with 
utmost care and precision—to bring fresh insight into the analysis of education 
policy and ultimately to improve the outcomes of our education system. 
∎ We thank Daron Acemog˘lu, Gordon Hansen, Al Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, and Timothy Taylor 
for comments.
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